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Testing for Causation in Tort Law
DAVID A COADY
The traditional, intuitively appealing, test for causation in tort law, known
as 'the but-for test' has been subjected to what are widely believed to he
devastating criticisms by Tony Honore, and Richard Wright, amongst
others. I argue that the but-for test can withstand these criticisms. Contrary
to what is now widely believed, there is no inconsistency between the but-
for test and ordinary language, commonsense, or sound legal principle.
Introduction:
Overdetermination and the but-for test
There is a widespread intuition that to say that one thing causes another is to
make a certain counterfactual claim; roughly, the claim that if the cause had
not occurred, neither would the effect.' In philosophy this intuition has
motivated a variety of counterfactual analyses of causation.' In legal
literature, especially that focusing on tort law, the same intuition has given
rise to the 'hut-for' test. Tony Honore explains the legal significance of this
test in the following passage:
Tort lawyers have traditionally held the view that, whatever the
meaning of causal connection, the way to test whether it exists in a
given case is to ask whether in the circumstances the hannful result
would have occurred in the absence of the wrongful act. This is the
widely adopted 'but-for' test ... J
This is TOugh because there are some things which seem to stand in causal
relations (eg unchanging states and facts) despite being poor English to
describe them as either 'occurring' or 'not occurring'.
David Hume's claim that one object causes a second when the
counterfactual "if the first object had not been, the second never had
existed" is true, has inspired these attempts. see An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding. Section VII. David Lewis is largely responsible for
the recent enthusiasm for the idea, see 'Causation' in his Philosophical
Papers Vol 2 (Oxford, 1986) 159-213. Hereinafter, 'Causation'.
Tony Honore, 'Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law' in David
GOwen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 1995) 363-386 at 383. Because of their more immediately practical
concerns, legal scholars have been inclined to use counterfaetuals to test for
the presence of causation, rather than to explicate the meaning of
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While conceding that the but-for test works well in most cases, Honore, and
other contemporary legal scholars, have argued that there are cases in which
it will find an act not to be a cause, even though it clearly is.' [ will argue
that, properly understood, none of these cases provide a good reason for
rejecting or modirying the but-for test.
The alleged counter-examples to the but-for test are usually called
cases of overdetermination. In tort law a case of overdetermination is a
situation in which two wrongful acts are followed by a harm; and if either
of the wrongful acts had occurred without the other, the harm would still
have occurred; but if neither of the wrongful acts had occurred, the harm
would not have occurred.' The but-for test does seem to lead to counter-
intuitive results in some cases of overdetermination. I believe, however, that
this appearance is deceptive and can be explained away. Previous attempts
to defend the but-for test have tried to do so by arguing, in effect, that there
is no such thing as overdetermination. I will argue that these attempts to
'get rid of overdetermination are misguided. The but-for test is quite
compatible with the existence of genuine cases of overdetermination.
Trying to get rid of overdetermination
Rollin Perkins, when considering a hypothetical in which someone is struck
simultaneously by two bullets, each of which would have been instantly
fatal by itself, claims that the but-for test will accurately find that both
shooters cause the victim's death:
Whenever that would not have happened when and as it did happen,
had it not been for this, this is an actual cause of that6
6
'causation '. Otherwise the philosophical and legal debates have been
remarkably similar.
Honore, ibid 383-84; Richard W Wright, 'Causation in Tort Law' (1985) 73
California Law Review 1735-1828 at 1775-76; Richard W Wright,
'Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics and Proof:
Pruning thc Bramblebush by Clarifying the Concepts' (1988) 73 Iowa Law
Review 1023-28.
The same tenninology has entered the philosophical debate about causation
through David Lewis, see 'Causation: Postscript E' 199. This debate is
closely analogous to that in tort law, although naturally the philosophical
debate is not restricted to causation between wrongful acts and harms.
Although it is possible that more than two wrongful acts could
ovcrdetermine a harm, I think we can assume that such cases will be quite
rarc. Furthennore it is easy to extend what I say to them. Consequently I will
restrict my comments to cases in which there are only two wrongful acts.
Rollin Perkins, Criminal Law (2nd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 1969)
689 (emphasis in original).
According to Perkins, both bullets count as causes, on the reasonable
assumption that the absence of either of them would have made some
difference to the way in which death occurred. Similarly, Arno C Becht and
Frank W Miller have argued that in a case in which there are two fires, one
started by the defendant, and each of which would have destroyed the
plaintiffs house in the absence of the other, the defendant's actions would
probably be a cause, since the smoke, ashes and some parts of the ruins
would probably have been somewhat different without it.'
This approach can be described as 'dissolving' cases of
overdetermination, by taking the harm in question to have very stringent
conditions of occurrence. In other words Perkins, Becht, and Miller
construe any counterfactual supposition according to which a harm occurs
in a different manner and/or at a different time as in fact being a supposition
according to which a different harm occurs. In such circumstances they
advise us to avoid saying that the harm would have occurred differently,
and say instead that a different harm would have occurred. This is a practice
allowed by ordinary thought and language. For example, one can say: if the
driver had been wearing a seat belt, his injury would have been different (ie,
less severe). One can just as well say, with the same meaning: if the driver
had been wearing a seat belt he would have received a different injury (ie, a
less severe one).
I do not think that Perkins, Becht or Miller would or should claim
that this strategy eliminates all logically possible caSes of
overdetermination. It is reasonable to suppose that cases can be coherently
described in which it would have made absolutely no difference to the harm
whether both of the wrongful acts had occurred or only one of them. The
following passage from David Lewis seems to be an adequate response to
this possibility:
Maybe so; but probably those residual cases would be mere
possibilities, far-fetched and contrary to the ways of this world.
Then we could happily leave them as spoils to the victor. For we
could plausibly suggest that commonsense is misled: its habits of
thought are formed by a world where every little thing that happens
spreads its little traces far and wide, and nothing that happens
thereafter is quite the same as it would have been after a different
past.8
Amo C Becht and Frank W Miller, The Test of Factual Causation in
Negligence and Strict Liability Cases (Washington University, St Louis,
1961) 18. Becht and Miller explicitly endorse what Perkins says about the
tw<>-bullets case. See Becht and Miller, ibid 17. They are quoting from the
first edition, but the quote remains the same.
Lewis, 'Causation: Postscript E', above n 5, 197-98.
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Even if you disagree with Lewis's position that a philosophical analysis of
causation can be satisfied with getting intuitively correct answers only in
'real world' cases, it seems hard to fault a practical legal test for restricting
its ambition in this way.
Nonetheless I do not endorse this strategy. The real problem with it is
that it is inconsistent with many intuitively appealing negative causal
judgements, because it counts anything that influences the time and/or
manner of a harm as a cause of it. This problem is evident in a hypothetical
discussed by Becht and Miller in which an inattentive driver hits a
pedestrian who runs into the path of the driver's car: if the driver had been
attentive, he could have swerved a little, but not enough to avoid causing
the pedestrian an equally serious injury. If we adopted the Perkins, Becht
and Miller strategy of ascribing very stringent conditions of occurrence to
harms, the but-for test would find the driver's inattention to be a cause of
the harm. This follows from the fact that they would have to count the
injury caused by the actual inattentive driving and the counterfactual injury
caused by attentive driving as different harms. Nonetheless, Becht and
Miller concede that the intuition of most laymen and lawyers is that the
inattentive driver in this example causes no harm: While insisting that this
intuition "is actually not true", they are understandably sceptical about the
prospects of their position being widely acceptedlO Finally they decide to
speak with the vulgar after all; saying that the driver's inattention "was not
a cause" after all, and calling the process by which they arrived at this
conclusion "equating the injuries"." Richard W. Wright has objected,
surely correctly, that this "introduces an inconsistency into their theory that
undermines their use of the minute-detail approach to support a finding of
causation in the merged-fires case.,,12
Becht and Miller might reply that the different treatment of the
inattentive-driver case on the one hand, and the merged-fires and
simultaneous-bullets cases on the other, is justified by the distinction
between causation by an omission in the former case and causation by a
positive act in the latter two. But there is no textual support for this
suggestion and it seems to lack any independent motivation. I conclude that
the need to preserve a distinction between merely affecting how or when a
harm takes place, on the one hand, and causing it, on the other, implies that
9
10
"12
Becht and Miller, above n 7, 29.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Wright (1985) above n 4, 1775. Wright describes the Perkins, Becht and
Miller approach as a "modification" of the but-for test. I think it is better to
see it as combination of that test with a particular view about the identity
conditions of hanns; namely that an actual hann could not have occurred at
a different time nor in a different manner.
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we should not always take hanns to have extremely stringent identity
conditions. Nor should we modify the but-for test to make the issue whether
the hann would have occurred at the time and in the manner it did in the
absence of the wrongdoing, rather than whether the hann would have
occurred at all in those counterfactual circumstances. ll
The two cases of overdetennination that have been considered so far
have both been instances of what Wright calls duplicative causation14 In
such cases the causal status of the wrongful acts are symmetrical with
respect to the hann they overdetennine; that is, they each have an equal
claim to being causes of it. Intuitions tend to differ in such cases about
whether we should say that both wrongful acts cause the hann, or whether
we should say that neither does, but at least it is clear that there is no reason
to say that one does, whereas the other does not. Because it is unclear what
to say about such cases they are poor guides to the adequacy of any
proposed test for causation. Some laymen and lawyers, for example, will
follow Becht and Miller in thinking that both fires in their merged-fires
example are causes, some will follow Wright in denying this.I' Intuitions
seem equally unclear in the two-bullet case, despite the following argument
by Perkins that we must accept that both shooters cause the death:
In the two-bullet case posed, if either shooter can claim conectly
that his shot was not in fact a cause of death, so may the other. The
unavoidable conclusion would be that the deceased did not in fact
die as a result of being shot - which is absurd. 16
But this conclusion is avoidable. It does not follow from the premise that
the victim did not die as a result of being shot by either shooter that he did
not die as a result of being shot by the combination of them; a combination
which one can think of in either set-theoretical or mereological tenns.
Unless there was a conspiracy or other incitement, there seems to be
nothing counter-intuitive about the conclusion that neither shooter caused
the death. That is not to say that there is anything particularly intuitively
appealing about this conclusion either. Intuitions about cases of duplicative
causation just seem to be too indecisive to bear the weight of theory.
Consequently, the but-for test is compatible with the existence of genuine
cases of duplicative causation.
13
14
I'
16
These two tests would amount to the same thing for all practical purposes;
differing only over the metaphysical issue of the identity conditions of
harms.
Wright, (1985) above n 4, 1775. In the philosophical literature these would
be called 'symmetrical overdetermination' or 'symmetrical redundancy'.
Ibid 1779.
Perkins, above n 6, 689.
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But not all cases of overdetennination are symmetrical. In a subset of cases
of overdetennination which have come to be known as cases of preemption
our intuitions seem more decisive. Intuitively it seems reasonably clear that
one of them, the preempting cause, does the causing; while the other, the
preempted allernative does not: the alternative is not a cause; though it
would have been one, if it had not been preempted." I will argue that a
correct understanding of the identity conditions of hanns in general will
show that many putative cases of preemption are not cases of
overdetennination at all. In such cases the but-for test will correctly find the
so-called preempting cause to be a cause, and the so-called preempted
alternative not to be a cause. In other cases I think the intuition that the so-
called preempting cause is a genuine cause can be explained away." Which
approach will be best may depend not only on the facts of the case, but the
extent of the hann being claimed by the plaintiff.
The key to understanding most cases of preemption in the literature
is, I submit, is to focus on the fact that the preempting cause is a hastener of
hann. This approach will not work, however, for the well-known
MCLauglin Hypothetical, since, as we shall see, it is not essential to it that
the preempting cause does hasten hann. Below, I have developed a strategy
for handling the nonnal cases in which the preempting cause is a hastener
of hann. A different strategy will inevitably be required for the McLaughlin
Hypothetical.
Preemption as causing by hastening
In most examples of preemption in the legal literature, it is essential to the
story that the hann (usually a death) occurs earlier than it would have
without the preempting cause. I , A couple of examples: the defendant
17
"
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Wright (1985) above n 4, 1775; Wright (1988) above n 4, 1024. The same
terminology has entered the philosophical debate about causation through
Lewis, see 'Causation: Postscript E', above n 5, 199. Just as cases of
preemption have been held to undermine the but-for test by much of the
legal literature, cases of preemption have been held to refute 'naive'
counterfactual analyses of causation by much of the philosophical literature.
For an argument against this philosophical orthodoxy see my 'Preempting
Preemption' in Jonathan Collins, LA Paul, and Ned Hall (eds), Causation
and CounterJactuals (MIT Press, Boston, 2001).
Although my position is that strictly speaking there is no sucb tbing as
preemption, in what follows I wlll use the tenn 'preemption' to refer to
putative examples of preemption.
This is also true of the parallel philosophical literature. The widespread use
of examples of killing to illustrate theories of causation is easier to
understand in the legal literature.
mortally burns the victim but before the victim dies of the burns someone
else kills him with a blow to the head;20 the defendant pushes the victim
from a tall building but on the way down the victim is shot and killed
instantly by another.21 In response to such examples 1 will return to the idea
of ascribing stringent, though not this time too stringent, identity conditions
to the harm. In such cases there is no need to appeal to a detailed
description of the manner in which it occurred; an idea which has already
been undermined by drawing attention to the distinction between causing an
event and merely affecting how it happens. Instead we can restrict ourselves
to a detailed description of the time at which the harm occurs, since it
would have been different, but for the preempting cause.
However, we must be careful. We do not want to say, for example,
that a counterfactual death that occurs at any time other than an actual one
is ipso/acto a different death. That would entail that saving a person's life
was causing that person's eventual death; since that death would not have
occurred but for the life-saving action. Just as there is a distinction between
affecting the manner of a death and causing it, there is a distinction between
affecting the time of a death and causing it.
Arguably this distinction is only legitimate in one temporal direction.
Although we typically do not want to say that delaying death is causing it,
we typically do want to say that hastening death is causing it. Someone who
brings it about that instead of dying now you die later is usually a life-saver,
rather than a killer, and someone who brings it about that you die an
"untimely" death is usually a killer, even though you would have died later
anyway. We can accommodate this asymmetry by distinguishing actual
deaths from any counterfactual deaths which would have occurred later than
them, while identifying actual deaths with counterfactual deaths (of the
same person) which would have occurred earlier than them. This will mean
that the but-for test will find the preempting causes (which have been
considered so far) to be genuine causes, without the undesirable side-effect
of finding life-saving actions to be causes of the deaths they delay.
In the following passage Tony Honore makes it clear that he would
reject this suggestion:
What has to be shown in a tort action is that the defendant's
wrongful act caused the hann, in this case the victim's death. We
know from the way in which the law structures actions for wrongful
20
21
State v Scates, 50 N.C. 409 (N.C. 1858).
Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (1st ed, Babbs-Merrill.
Indianapolis, 1947) 262.
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death that what is legally relevant is death, not death at this or that
time or plaee or by this or that process.22
This seems to assume incorrectly that we can individuate harms
independently of when, where or how they occur. It is particularly clear in
cases in which the harm is death that we cannot draw a clear-cut distinction
between causing it on the one hand, and causing it to occur at a certain time
and place or by a certain process on the other. This is why a lawyer cannot
legitimately argue that his client's so-called causing of death was instead a
hastening of death; that he is guilty merely of causing death at a certain time
and place and by a certain process, rather than many years later in bed and
of old age.
We ordinarily think that the earlier death occurs, all else being equal,
the more of a harm it is. Furthermore, we ordinarily think of causing death
to occur at an earlier time than it otherwise would have as causing death
simpliciter. It is true that some lawyers and lay people may be reluctant to
describe a person who hastens death by a matter of minutes or hours as a
killer, especially if he or she does so with a benevolent motive. This
reluctance may be increased, if the hastening of death is the result of an
omission rather than a positive act. Does a nurse kill a patient by taking him
off life-support at his request when it is clear that he is going to die soon
anyway? Does a doctor kill a patient when she slightly hastens that patient's
death by giving him a dose of morphine with the sole intention of relieving
his pain? Of course people opposed to such practices will say 'Yes!'. I
submit that those who are in favour of them should overcome their
reluctance and agree. This shared use of terminology makes a meaningful
debate about whether or when mercy killing can be justified possible.
Sometimes we are justifiably reluctant to say something, because it is false.
At other times, and I think such cases illustrate this, we may be reluctant to
say something, because it suggests a falsehood. We may be reluctant to
describe some death-hastener's act or omission as killing, because that
would imply that he or she did something wrong, or failed to do something
right, because death is usually a very significant harm.
My suggestion that a counterfactual death which occurs later than an
actual one should always count as a different death is not an ad hoc
stipulation designed to protect the but-for test against troublesome cases of
22 Honore, above n 3, 378. Honore cites Wright (1985) above n 4, 1777-8 and
Wright (1988) above n 4, 1025-6, as authority for this claim about the way
in which the law is struetured. I will leave it to the reader to determine
whether this is a reasonable interpretation of Wright's position in those
passages. I do not think it is; though it is easy to see how they eould be
interpreted that way.
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preemption. Quite independently of this, it is supported by the plausible
view that to hasten death is always to cause death.23
But of course not all hanns are deaths. Hart and Honore have
discussed a hypothetical in which the defendant starts a fire which would
have destroyed the victim's property were it not for a flood which puts out
the fire and destroys the property instead." Because each of us undergoes
exactly one death, it is particularly clear that causing death is <at least
typically) hastening death. This point about hastening is, however, not true
of hanns in general. One can cause hann without hastening hann." I
submit, however, that one cannot hasten hann without causing hann; which
is not to say, of course, that one cannot hasten hann in order to avoid a
greater hann. Consequently I propose the general thesis that to hasten hann
is to cause hann. This accords with the human propensity for "time-
discounting", that is, of considering a harm in the immediate future to be
ipso facIo a greater hann than an otherwise similar harm in the more distant
future. Many philosophers consider time discounting to be a species of
irrationality." Legal theory cannot afford, however, to treat actual human
attitudes and values so lightly, just as it cannot afford to allow consideration
of the inevitability of death to persuade it that there are no such things as
killers.
Of course hastening is a matter of degree. In the case under
consideration, the destruction of the house is presumably hastened only
very slightly by the flood. Hart and Honore claim that a person whose
negligence was responsible for the flood should bear sole liability for the
destruction of the property. I think that person could legitimately respond
that the destruction of a property that was about to bum down anyway is
little or no harm at all. It would only be a harm, if the property would have
been of benefit to the victim during the interval between the time it was in
fact destroyed and the time it otherwise would have burnt down. Similarly,
in the other cases of preemption we have considered, the killers could
concede that they caused death, but plausibly argue that the death in
21
24
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1 say that hastening death is a sufficient condition for causing death. I am
tempted to say that it is also a necessary condition. 1 will not commit myself
to this stronger position however. Depending on how some of the details are
filled out, the McLaughlin Hypothetical, which I will shortly discuss, may
be a case in which a killer delays, rather than hastens, death.
H L A Hart and T Honore, Causation in the Law (2nd ed, Clarendon Press,
Oxford) 239.
For a more generaJ discussion of the relation between hastening and causing
see Penelope Mackie, 'Causing, Delaying, and Hastening: Do Rains Cause
Fires?', (1992) 101 Mind 483-500.
See Norman Daniels, Just Health Care, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1985) 99, and Robert Goodin, No Smoking: the Ethical Issues,
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989) 22-3.
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question was not a great harm, since the victim would have died shortly
afterwards anyway.
The McLaughlin Hypothetical
Not all cases of preemption in the literature are amenable to this treatment.
In the well known McLaughlin hypothetical: person A seeks to kill person
C by poisoning water needed by C to cross a desert, but, before C has
occasion to have a drink, person B drains the poisoned water from the keg
and C dies of thirst. 27 The standard view of this case is that B, and not A,
causes C's death; that is, that B's action is the preempting cause and A's
action is the preempted alternative. It is not essential to this hypothetical,
however, that B's action hastens death. In fact it will make the case more
interesting if we assume that the poison was sufficiently fast-acting that B's
action delayed C's death. 28
Not everyone, however, shares the standard view of this case. Hart
and Honore have long held that neither A nor B cause death. Honore has
recently recanted and joined the standard view. His reason for changing his
mind is) however, not convincing:
My current reasoning is that 8's conduct introduces a condition, lack
of water, that in the circumstanees. including the absence of an
alternative water supply, is sufficient to bring about and does bring
about C's death from dehydration."
But it appears that A's conduct also introduces a condition that in the
circumstances is sufficient to bring about C's death, although not his death
from dehydration.30
This illustrates the fact that our considered judgements about the
causes of what seems pre-theoretically to be a single event (or state, or
27
28
"30
(1925-6) 39 Harvard Law Review 149, ISS fn 25. In McLaugWin's original
example B empties the water keg and fills it with salt. Hart and Honore's
Causation in the Law are responsible for the story as I am presenting it. This
is the fann in which it is now usually discussed.
The possibility of the preempting cause being a delayer rather than a
hastener is characteristic of what the parallel philosophieal literature has
called early preemption, in which the alternative (ie, preempted) process is
cut off as a result of a side-efTect of the main (ie, preempting) process. This
contrasts with the previous examples of late preemption, in which the
alternative is cut ofT by the premature occurrence of the effect itself. See
Lewis 'Causation: Postscript E' above n 5.
Honore, above n 3, 378.
I leave it to the reader to decide how Or whether Honore's appeal to the fact
that death was by dehydration can be reconciled with the previous quotation,
drawn from the same page, in which he says that "what is legally relevant is
death, not death at this or that time or place or by this or that process."
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omission) can depend on how it is described. For example, you close the
door while in a bad mood; as a result of your bad mood you slam the door.
It seems your bad mood caused the slamming, but not the closing, even
though it also seems that there is a sense in which the closing and the
slamming are one and the same event.'1 Similarly, we can and should
distinguish between the causes of C's death and the causes of C's death by
dehydration, and between both of these and the causes of C's death in the
desert. It is plausible to suppose that neither A nor B causes C to die in the
desert (though the combination of their actions does), whereas B alone
causes C to die of dehydration." I do not think there are any legitimate
intuitions or legal principles that can decisively detennine whether B causes
C's death simpliciter. Our criteria for distinguishing between causing an
event and merely influencing how and when it occurs lead in different
directions when we consider C's death qua death. Ordinarily we do not
think that delaying death, unlike hastening it, is causing death. This
suggests that neither B nor A are causes. On the other hand, we do
ordinarily think that having a significant enough influence on the manner of
a death constitutes killing. This suggests that B alone causes C's death.
Consequently conceptual clarification alone seems unable to
detennine whether B is guilty of murder or only guilty of attempted murder.
It is not surprising then that legal scholars and philosophers disagree about
the issue. It seems plausible that the matter can only be resolved by
considerations of policy, rather than metaphysics." That would require a
31
12
Jl
The example is from Jaegwon Kim, 'Causes and Counterfacluals' (1973) 70
Journal ofPhilosophy 570-572.
This phenomenon has given rise to a philosophical debate. See Alvin I
Goldman, A Theory of Human Action, (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970)
ch I, would claim that it means that C's death and C's death by dehydration
are in fact different events. Others would claim that, since C's death and C's
death by dehydration are obviously the same event, the most fundamental
kind of causal relation must be between something other than events. Thus
Jonathan Bennett has claimed that it is a relation between facts, see Events
and Their Names (Hackett, 1988), and Christopher Hitchcock has claimed
that it is a relation between events-in-contrast-to-altematives, see <The Role
of Contrast in Causal and Explanatory Claims' (1990) 85 Synthese 395-419.
I would argue that we can (and should) accept that there is a sense in which
C's death and C's death by dehydration are different events, while also
doing to justice to the intuition that they are the same event, see my
'Preempting Preemption' above n 17. Some sense of how this is possible
can be gained by comparing it to the 'issue' of whether London and Greater
London are different cities.
The last-wrongdoer rule, for example, which was explicitly justified entirely
in terms of policy. states that the wrongdoer closest in time to the effect was
alone responsible for it. This implies that 8 is guilty of murder. The
last-wrongdoer rule is discussed in Laurence Eldredge, 'Culpable
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detailed discussion of the subtle problem of why we treat unsuccessful
assassins more leniently than successful ones, which is beyond the scope of
this articleJ ' The but-for test does not help us to resolve the issue of
whether B is a killer, but at least there seems no reason to believe that it
would lead to a mistaken verdict.
If I am right that legitimate intuitions about the causes of an event
may depend on how that event is described, then we should be prepared to
make a distinction between the factors which cause C to be harmed (the
concern of tort law), and the factors which cause C to die (the concern of
criminal law), even though the harm in this case is death. I think that
whether or not B causes C harm depends on the prosaic issue of whether or
not death by dehydration is more of a harm than death by poison. If it is,
then B causes the harm in question; if it is not, then neither A nor B cause
it. If death by poison were sufficiently painful, B could plausibly argue that
he did not cause any harm to the already doomed C. I have left open the
possibility that B could be have killed C, without doing C any harm. This
may seem strange, but the concept of mercy killing already makes it plain
that there is room for this possibility.
Conclusion
I have tried to show that cases of overdetermination can be reconciled with
the but-for test without giving up any compelling intuitions or legal
principles. In cases of duplicative causation we want to say that both
wrongs cause the harm, or that neither does. It is tempting to grab the
former horn of this dilemma, because it may seem that otherwise we would
be committed to the absurd view that the harm is uncaused. This conclusion
can be resisted, however, by insisting that although neither of the wrongs
causes the harm, the combination of them does.
Whether a case is an instance of overdetermination or not may
depend on the extent of the harm being claimed by the plaintiff. In many
cases of preemption we should say that one of the wrongs causes harm,
because to hasten harm is to cause harm. In such cases the preempting cause
is responsible for a lesser harm than he or she would be, if it were not for
the preempted alternative. This lesser harm is not overdetermined;
consequently the but-for test will correctly find the preempting cause to be
responsible for it.
34
Intervention as Superseding Cause' (1938) 86 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 121.
See Leo Katz, 'Why the Successful Assassin is More Wicked than the
Unsuccessful One' (2000) 88 California Law Review 791- 812.
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This approach may not be applicable to the McLaughlin
Hypothetical. But if the details are filled out in such a way that the victim's
death would have been just as significant a harm were it not for B's action, I
submit that we should say that B did not cause the victim any harm. This
can be hard to see, because there is considerable (though not, I think,
decisive) intuitive appeal to the idea that B alone causes C's death. Hence
we may be tempted to argue that since C's death was a harm, B caused that
harm. The persuasive power of the argument will be undermined, however,
if we remember that legitimate intuitions about an event's causes can
depend on how that event is described. We should be ready to distinguish
between the factors that caused C to die, and those that caused C to be
harmed.
Wright has called appeals to the details of the harm in cases of
overdetermination nothing more than "proof by tautology"; suggesting that
prior to deciding which details are relevant and which are not one must
already have made a decision about the issue the test is supposed to
determine, that is, the causal status of the wrongs.35 have tried to show that
Wright is mistaken. Instead we should decide which details of the harm are
relevant, by considering its identity conditions qua harm. I submit that once
we do so any appearance of conflict between our best causal judgements
and the determinations of the but-for test will disappear. In the landmark
case of March v Slramere the Australian High Court held that the but-for
test was not conclusive. Instead it was decided that causation should be
determined by ordinary notions of language and common sense." If I am
right, there is no conflict between the but-for test and ordinary language or
common sense.
"J6
Wright, (1985) above n 4, 1777-78, and Wright, (1988) above n 4, 1025.
(1991) 171 CLR 506.
